Introduction
Monetary policy responses to the global financial crisis can shed light on the spillover effects of monetary policy to emerging economies. When the Federal Reserve ("Fed") adopted a series of unconventional monetary policies known as Quantitative Easing ("QE") and Forward Guidance in 2008, the side effects were transmitted through global financial markets. In particular, emerging economies felt the surge in liquidity after the adoption of QE.
In 2014, the Fed has eventually unwound its asset purchases ("tapering") after announcing the tapering in 2013 and is expected to "lift-off " the Federal Funds rate gradually, that is, the Fed is about to normalize its monetary policy.
Spillover effects pose major challenges to policymakers in emerging countries (Lavigne et al., 2014 : Chen et al., 2014 : Tillmann, 2015 : Chen et al., 2015 : MacDonald, 2015 . The flood of liquidity under QE is believed to lead to an easing of monetary conditions, a surge in asset prices and domestic currency appreciations. Furthermore, abundant liquidity is raising financial stability concerns. Many central banks and regulators have responded to this by a monetary tightening and/or the use of macroprudential policy tools. The reversal of capital flows after 2014 has led to a sharp depreciation and a drop in asset prices in emerging market economies. In order to choose the right policy response, understanding the nature of these spillovers is essential. This paper presents a large collection of findings on the nature of spillover effects. We empirically quantify the recent spillover effects and make four contributions. First, we focus on the effects of both conventional and unconventional monetary policy. This is accomplished by using the identified shock component of the (shadow) Federal Funds rate as a measure of U.S. monetary policy, which allows us to estimate a consistent model under both policy regimes. Second, we study the notion of a "New Normal," i.e. a change in the pattern of spillovers after the financial crisis by comparing a pre-crisis and a post-crisis regime. Third, we allow for tightening and easing measures to have different effects. This enables us to quantify the asymmetric nature of the spillover effects. Fourth, we relate the strength of the spillover effects to the macroeconomic fundamentals of emerging market economies. As a result, we can identify which particular form of weakness gives rise to a large exposure to U.S. policy shocks.
Our main empirical tool for the analysis of policy transmission is a vector autoregression (VAR) model of standard financial variables of emerging markets, which we augment by introducing an exogenous change in U.S. monetary policy.
The fact that U.S. policy enters exogenously transforms the model into a VAR-X model. In order to focus on unexpected changes in U.S. monetary conditions, we estimate an auxiliary VAR model for the U.S. economy and feed the identified policy shock into the VAR-X model for emerging market economies. From the perspective of a prototypical emerging economy, U.S. monetary policy can clearly be considered exogenous. Rather than estimating a panel model for a large set of emerging market economies, this paper estimates a series of country-specific time-series VAR-X models. We think this approach is better able to shed light on the large degree of heterogeneity across countries.
We find that spillovers are divergent. Both the sign and the size of spillovers changed over regime. We do not find, however, that spillovers are systematically higher post-2008. There are not only structural breaks over time but also asymmetries as regards the sign of the policy shock itself. In many countries, the spillovers after a tightening shock and an easing shock in the U.S. differ in terms of their absolute magnitude and their dynamics. From them, fundamentally weak economies appear to suffer from stronger spillovers than fundamentally strong economies.
The results are relevant for policymakers in emerging economies: our findings suggest that not all spillovers are equal. To the extent spillovers are asymmetric, the appropriate policy response cannot be linear. For example, if macroprudential policies are considered to offset the consequences of unwarranted spillover effects, these instruments have to be adjusted to be an efficient tool to contain the effects of U.S. policy shocks. In light of our results, the need to fine-tune macroprudential policies challenges the efficient design of appropriate policies. The interest rate lift-off and the subsequent return to an interest rate policy is likely to lead to renewed tensions in emerging market economies -which will put policies to a test.
Our results show that strong macroeconomic fundamentals are the best way to make emerging economies less vulnerable to spillovers. This paper proceeds as follow. Section 2 introduces the VAR-X model, which is our main modeling framework. The main results are presented in Section 3.
Section 4 related spillover effects to macroeconomic fundamentals. Sections 5 offers a concluding summary and draws policy implications.
A VAR-X Model of Monetary Spillovers
To estimate the spillover effects of U.S. monetary policy on emerging economies, we estimate a series of VAR-X models, i.e., VAR models augmented by an exogenous variable. Shocks to the exogenous variable are the focus of our study. VAR-X models have recently been used in the literature: Bassett et al. (2010) feed an exogenous credit supply shock in an otherwise standard VAR model of the U.S. economy to study the effects of an exogenous change in lending. Wu and Cavallo (2012) include an exogenous oil price shock in a VAR system. In a paper similar in focus to ours, Miyajima, Mohanty and Yetman (2014) estimate a panel VAR model of Asian economies where monetary policy in the U.S. enters as an exogenous variable. Compared to their paper we offer a unifying perspective on conventional and unconventional monetary policy and also allow for shifts in the strength of policy transmission over time. We also prefer a country-by-country perspective over a panel in order to link the strength of the transmission to economic fundamentals.
In our model, the vector of the first differences of n endogenous variables,   , is determined as follows
where    is a polynomial in the lag operator. A measure of U.S. monetary policy is included as an exogenous variable,    
. The impact effect of U.S.
policy on the endogenous variables is reflected by the vector . 1) 1) Including lags of the exogenous variables does not change our findings.
Since the stance of U.S. policy is clearly exogenous from the perspective of an emerging market economy, and we are interested in the endogenous responses to exogenous policy only, there is no need for further identifying assumptions.
Hence, we do not intend to identify other shocks to the endogenous variables which would necessitate imposing identifying assumptions. The literature offers a range of identification schemes, all of which necessitate imposing more or less ad-hoc constraints. We take the VAR-X model as a useful representation of the dynamics of the data and thus avoid the arbitrariness involved in many identification schemes used in the literature.
The model is estimated on weekly data to avoid washing out the volatility in emerging markets when using monthly or even quarterly data. This is considered an important advantage in order to grasp the fast transmission of policy shocks to emerging economies. The vector of endogenous variables consists of (1) the log-difference of the nominal domestic stock price index,   , (2) the log-difference of the nominal exchange rate against the U.S. dollar with an increase of the exchange rate reflecting a depreciation of the domestic currency,   , and (3) the change in domestic long-term bond yields,   ,
The 10 countries included in this paper are Brazil (BRA), Chile (CHL), Czech 
where      is the shock component of the (shadow) Federal Funds rate obtained from adopting sign restrictions and a historical decomposition, respectively. This series is then interpolated from monthly to weekly frequency using EViews. 4) As mentioned before, we also use the change in the shadow Federal Funds rate itself as a measure of U.S. monetary policy, i.e.
where      is the first difference of the (shadow) Federal Funds rate. 4) We believe interpolating the shadow rate to weekly frequency is an innocuous transformation. It is unlikely that we impose much additional on the data that would ultimately disturb our estimates. 5) See Francis et al. (2014) for an analysis of whether the shadow rate is a useful proxy for modeling policy in VAR models. 
Results
We expect a tightening in the U.S., i.e. an increase in the shock component of the (shadow) Federal Funds rate, to lead to capital outflows from emerging 6) For some countries the estimation starts later due to data availability.
economies. This would be consistent with a drop in domestic stock prices, a depreciation of the exchange rate and an increase in long-term bond yields of emerging economies. We will now discuss the results of our empirical analysis in light of these priors.
Benchmark results
The benchmark results are presented in Figure invest in mature economies and leave emerging economies. The consequence would be a drop in asset prices, a nominal devaluation and an increase in bond yields and monetary conditions tighten. There is, however, an alternative transmission channel. If the U.S. tightens, this is indication of favorable macroeconomic conditions today, i.e. strong real growth. In a world economy connected by strong trade ties, this is beneficial for export-oriented emerging economies because global demand is high. As a consequence, a tightening in the U.S. could well be associated with an increase in emerging markets' stock prices.
Emerging economies exhibit changes in the signs of the responses to U.S. policy depending on which of these two alternative transmission channels dominates. In emerging bond markets, the responses to U.S policy shocks also reveal opposite signs in several countries including the Czech Republic, Hungary, Indonesia, and Poland. One possible explanation of this differentiated transmission effect is that the target of EMEs' policy responding to U.S. interest rate shocks differ by countries: that is, for some countries, containing inflationary pressure is the main policy goal where raising policy rates lowers inflation, leading to drops in long-term bond rates, while in others alleviating real economic contraction is more important, so cutting policy rate leads to lower bond rates without upward inflationary pressure.
A third observation pertains not only to the signs of the responses change across sample periods, but also the magnitude of the responses. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that the responses are broadly similar in magnitudes in the second sample compared to the first. Take Brazil, Figure ( Normal" (Aizenman, Chinn and Ito, 2015) of spillovers after the crisis should be used to describe the size of the spillovers. As a matter of fact, the spillovers perceived by emerging market economies are the product of the size of the spillovers and the size of the monetary policy change in advanced economies.
During and after the financial crisis, the latter component was exceptionally large,
while the first appears to be unchanged.
The wide disparity of spillovers, both in terms of magnitudes and directions, is certainly linked to underlying economic fundamentals. Below we will link this heterogeneity with countries' fundamental macroeconomic weaknesses. Before that, however, we will discuss the asymmetry of spillovers in some detail.
An alternative measure of U.S. monetary policy
As mentioned before, we also use the change in the (shadow) Federal Funds rate itself as a measure of U.S. policy in our VAR-X model. We use change of the For change in the Wu-Xia shadow rate, see Figure ( 3), our VAR-X shows that in sample II all stock prices fall after a monetary policy change. Furthermore, in sample II all exchange rates exhibit a depreciation after a Fed tightening. Overall, the effects on the exchange rate are unanimously stronger in the second sample.
While the results are more clear-cut compared to our primary findings obtained from the shock component of the Wu-Xia shadow rate only, we believe the shock component is a conceptually more appealing measure of U.S. monetary policy. 8) 8) Of courses, the results of this estimation may differ depending on the methodology of obtaining the shadow rates. For example, we can see quite different pattern in the impulses responses when we employ the Krippner shadow rate. See the Appendix for the results with Krippner shadow rates. Some authors such as Lombardiand Zhu (2014) propose a methodology employing a factor model to include a large set of financial data.
Different effects of tightening and easing shocks? An asymmetric VAR-X model
The previous sections have highlighted the time-variation in international policy spillovers. In this section we will study whether the international spillover effects from tapering unconventional policies are larger than those from announcing QE. Put differently, we ask whether the absolute effect of a tightening shock is different from the absolute effect of an easing shock. The existing literature on the domestic transmission of monetary policy evokes the metaphor of "pulling versus pushing a string" (Tenreyro and Thwaites, 2015) . In a boom phase, monetary policy "pulls on a string" and the economy contracts. In a recession, policy pushed on that very same "string" -which is clearly less effective.
The result is an asymmetric domestic transmission mechanism. Here we ask whether we see a similar asymmetry on a global scale.
Gambacorta and Rossi (2007) than an identically sized contractionary shock.
Taken together, the evidence for asymmetries of QE in the sense of different effects of tightening and easing steps is mixed. Therefore, we extend our model to evaluate whether the countries in our sample experienced asymmetric spillover effects. We estimate a modified VAR-X model, which we refer to as an Asymmetric VAR-X model or AVAR-X. The model is
In this model, we split the exogenous shadow rate into rate increases and decreases, respectively. To highlight the differences with respect to the policy stance, we focus on the second sample period, which witnessed a dramatic easing of policy and the subsequent tightening. We expect that, in general, tightening shocks incur lower stock prices, higher bond rates, and a depreciation in EMEs' currencies. If spillovers are symmetric, easing shocks have opposite signs. However, as we discussed in previous section, the impacts can vary according to EMEs' macroeconomic situation and their policy goals at that time.
The results are again visualized by impulse response functions. Figures (5a) to (5j) depict the responses to a tightening of U.S. policy, i.e. a shock of +0.25pp
(shaded area), and an easing shock, i.e. a shock of -0.25pp (dotted lines). Thus, the maximum degree of asymmetry is obtained when both a tightening shock and an easing shock lead to the same impulse response pattern. The sensitivity is 9) Bassett et al. (2010) also study asymmetries in their VAR-X model. They focus on tightening and easing shocks to credit standards. Their findings suggest that tightening shocks have the expected signs, while easing shocks lead to insignificant estimates. The results highlight strong asymmetries pertaining to the sign, the size and the shape of the responses to tightening and easing shocks. These asymmetries also explain some of the insignificant and inconclusive response we have obtained from the linear VAR-X model.
We explain the asymmetries with reference to the results for Korea, Mexico and Poland. In Korea, see Figure ( 5f), a tightening in the U.S. leads, as expected, to a fall in stock prices by 1% to 1.5%. An easing of the same size, however, leads to an increase in stock prices of only 0.6%, which is insignificantly different from zero.
Hence, spillovers are twice as strong after a policy tightening. Comparing the point estimates for the response of the KRW, we find that the appreciation resulting from an easing by the Fed is smaller than the depreciation resulting from a Fed tightening. Both a tightening and an easing leads to a small but insignificant increase in Korean bond yields. For Mexico, see Figure ( 5h), we find that the responses of stock prices and the exchange rate are quite symmetric.
Bond yields do not respond, either to a tightening or an easing shock, respectively.
For Poland, see Figure (5j ), a policy tightening seems to have much larger consequences for the exchange rate than an easing of the Fed. Following a tightening, the Polish currency depreciates by 1.5% while an easing leaves the exchange rate unaffected. We conclude that for many countries the spillovers exhibit an important degree of asymmetry. The evidence suggests a small tendency for a U.S. tightening (e.g., QE tapering) being more effective on emerging financial markets than an easing (e.g., introducing QE) of similar magnitude. That would mean that the notion of "pushing on a string" might also be a good metaphor for international spillover effects of monetary policy.
The previous results on asymmetric spillovers were derived from the post-2008 sample period. tightening shock has larger effects on emerging markets than an easing shock of identical size. In Mexico, e.g., a tightening reduces stock prices by roughly one percent, while a policy easing raises stock prices raises stock prices by less than one percent. Hence, the coming tightening cycle of the Federal Reserve will put relatively more pressure on EME's stock prices than the introduction of QE some years ago. For some countries (IND, KOR, MEX and PHL) we find that in the first sample the asymmetry of the responses is much larger than in the second sample.
For these countries both a tightening and an easing shock lead to an increase in domestic stock prices.
As regards the response of the exchange rate, our results suggest that for BRA, CHL, CZR, HUN, IND, MAL and MEX an easing of monetary conditions in the U.S. has larger consequences than a tightening. For KOR and POL we find the opposite, i.e. a tightening leads to a depreciation that is larger in absolute terms that the devaluation following an easing shock. 
The Role of Macroeconomic Fundamentals
It is clear that domestic macroeconomic fundamentals play a key role for the sensitivity of emerging countries to foreign policy spillovers. Recent work by Ahmed et al. (2015) , Georgiadis (2015) and others show that the exposure to spillovers depends on fundamentals, with the strength between fundamentals and spillovers varying strongly across countries.
It remains to analyze whether the magnitude and the sign of the spillovers estimated in this paper are reflecting macroeconomic conditions. For that purpose, we first obtain the cumulative impulse responses for each of the three endogenous variables over 10 periods following a tightening shock. Note that for this analysis we no longer differentiate between a tightening and an easing shock as the model we use is linear. This is done for all countries and the two sample periods: 2004 -2008 (sample I) and 2009 -2014 (sample II). In a second step, we relate these cumulative responses to fundamentals. For every of the 10 countries, we collect data on the current account balance relative to GDP, the external indebtedness of the government relative to GDP, the level of foreign exchange reserves to GDP, the degree of openness in terms of exports and imports and the level of the country's CDS spreads as a measure of its default risk. These indicators are averaged over the two sample periods and related to the accumulated impulse responses discussed before.
The scatter plots in Figures (7a) to (7e) show that the magnitudes of the impulse responses vary with fundamentals. In all figures we also plot a regression line together with 95% confidence bands. As a matter of fact, the simple bivariate relationship between responses and fundamentals is far from perfect.
Nevertheless, it allows us to extract a few clear patterns. We believe a regression of impulse responses on fundamentals is not feasible due to the small number of observations. Take the level of external debt to GDP in sample II as a fundamental, see Figure ( 7a). The more indebted a country is, the stronger is the depreciation pressure on the currency upon tightening policy shocks in sample I.
For the second sample we also find that the higher the debt level, the more sensitive is the response of bond yields to policy shocks. For stock prices we find positively sloped connection to fundamentals only in the first sample period. In the second, the slope is roughly zero.
Figure (7b) reveals that the strength of the spillovers since the financial crisis is associated with the current account positions. The more the country's external position is in deficit, the more negative the response of stock prices in the second sample. For the exchange rate, the role of current account imbalances is present in both subsamples: The more the current account is in deficit, the stronger the depreciation of the national currency. The larger the current account deficit, the larger is the fall in bond yields in sample I. GDP. For all combinations of variables, samples and fundamentals, the slope of the regression line is hardy distinguishable from zero. Only for stock prices in sample II the reserve ratio offers some explanatory power: the lower reserves, the larger the fall in stock prices if the U.S. tightens.
For economic openness as a fundamental factor, see Figure ( 7d), we find that the sensitivities of bond yields in sample II and exchange rates to U.S. policy in sample I increase with openness -a finding that is highly plausible.
The average CDS spread, see Figure ( 7e), exhibits the largest explanatory power for bond yields in sample II. The higher the default risk, the more do bond yields respond to U.S. policy. For most other variables' responses the CDS spread is a less relevant explanatory factor.
We can summarize the main implications from this analysis as follows: a "lift-off " of the Federal Funds rate in 2015/16 will put pressure on bond yields of countries with high CDS spreads, a high external indebtedness and a high degree of openness. Likewise, stock prices will suffer from the retrenchment of capital flows following "lift-off " if they have a high current account deficit and low levels of reserves.
Among our countries are Indonesia and Brazil, which were part of the set of "fragile five" emerging economies, together with India, Turkey and South Africa.
The fragile five came under hefty pressure in 2013 when the Fed started to unwind its unconventional measures. Our results corroborate the view that these countries are among the countries most prone to spillover effects. Brazil and Indonesia had high current account deficits, relatively few reserves and experienced a strong depreciation. Moreover, their sovereign CDS spreads are topped only by those of Hungary, thus implying a strong effect of Fed tightening on domestic bond yields.
To summarize the role of fundamentals, we organize the impulse response functions according to the fundamental position of each economy, that is, we present an impulse response for "weak" economy and average "strong" economies, where we classify a country's fundamental position according to different fundamentals. For each of the fundamentals (current account to GDP, reserves to GDP, external debt and CDS spread, each of which is averaged over the second sample) we order the countries according to whether their fundamentals are above or below the median country.
In the former case a country is considered "strong" while in the latter the country is considered "weak." 10) Finally, we average the impulse responses within the group of weak and strong economies, respectively, where we focus only on the three weakest and three strongest countries. This gives us five sets of impulse responses, one for each fundamental, where in each graph we see both responses for strong and for weak economies.
The results are shown in Figures (8) . The strong economies are represented by the shaded area while the weak economies' responses correspond to the dotted lines. We see that the fundamental position matters for the FX rate and the yield responses, but to a smaller extent for the stock price response. In most cases, 10) Of course we take into account that for some fundamentals, being below the median signals stronger fundamentals, e.g., for CDS spreads, indebtedness and others. fundamentally weak economies exhibit a substantively stronger depreciation and stronger increase in domestic bond yield than fundamentally strong economies.
The median response for the group of the three strongest economies lies outside the confidence band surrounding the response of the group of weak economies.
From that we can conclude that fundamentals indeed matter much for explaining a country's exposure to spillovers.
Conclusions
In this paper we studied the spillover effects of conventional and unconventional monetary policy in the U.S. on a set of 10 emerging market economies. For this purpose we estimated a range of VAR models in which U.S.
monetary conditions entered exogenously. Our primary measure of U.S. policy is the identified shock component of the shadow Federal Funds rate. This gives us an estimate of policy shocks that is consistent with both conventional and unconventional monetary policy.
We derived three key findings.
(1) The size and the sign of spillover effects on domestic equity returns, exchange rate changes and changes in bond yields vary across regimes, and there is no common pattern of spillovers. We also do not find that spillovers are systematically higher after the global financial crisis. (2) Allowing the transmission of policy shocks to be asymmetric, we find that a U.S.
tightening has stronger impacts on emerging financial markets than an easing policy does. In this aspect, the discussion of spillover effects should acknowledge the fact that tightening and easing shocks originating in the U.S. can lead to highly asymmetric spillover effects. (3) The sensitivity of emerging market economies to U.S. policy is related to the fundamental weakness of the economy.
An increase in several macroeconomic weakness indicators such as the current account deficit relative to GDP or the external indebtedness leads to larger spillovers.
Our results have policy implications for the Fed's and other central banks'
lift-off from the zero lower bound. When the Fed raises the Federal Funds rate for the first time since 2006 , emerging market economies will be hit. In fact, the anticipation of the lift-off in recent month has put emerging markets under pressure -very much in line with our model in which it is the surprise component of the shadow rate that drives emerging markets' financial conditions. Eventually, also the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan and the European Central Bank will exit from unconventional policies and will tighten monetary conditions further by raising interest rates. Our results also suggest that the nonlinear and asymmetric nature of spillovers makes the design of appropriate macroprudential policies challenging, if not impossible. A macroprudential policy instrument has to be adjusted in order to address the waves of capital flows resulting from policy spillovers. It remains to be seen whether macroprudential policy can accomplish that. Our preferred policy response could aim at keeping the economy fundamentally sound. We showed that an economy with strong fundamentals is best prepared to withstand most of the externalities of advanced countries' monetary policy.
